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Recent micro studies have documented extensive downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) 
for job stayers in many OECD countries, but the effect on aggregate variables remains 
disputed. Using data for hourly nominal wages, we explore the existence of DNWR on wages 
at the industry level in 19 OECD countries, over the period 1973–1999. Based on a novel 
method, we reject the hypothesis of no DNWR. The fraction of wage cuts prevented due to 
DNWR has fallen over time, from 61 percent in the 1970s to 16 percent in the late 1990s, but 
the number of industries affected by DNWR has increased. DNWR is more prevalent when 
unemployment is low, union density is high, and employment protection legislation is strict. 
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Recent micro economic studies have found considerable downward nominal wage rigidity (dnwr)
for job stayers in oecd countries. The International Wage Flexibility Project (Dickens et al.,
2006) ﬁnds that for all the 16 countries that are studied, dnwr prevents wage cuts from taking
place, with the fraction of wage cuts prevented being in the range of 9–66 percent, see literature
review in section 2 below. The extensive dnwr found in micro studies, combined with mon-
etary policy aiming for low rates of inﬂation, make Tobin’s contention that this combination
leads to greater wage pressure and higher unemployment (Tobin, 1972) again of great policy
relevance.
However, when it comes to identifying the aggregate eﬀects of dnwr, the results are more
disputed. Fehr and Gotte (2005) show that dnwr is associated with higher unemployment
among Swiss cantons. Moreover, several papers have found empirical support for Tobin’s
contention (see e.g. Akerlof et al., 1996, Karanassou et al., 2003 and Dickens et al., 2006),
yet other economists are skeptical towards the reliability of these ﬁndings (e.g. Gordon, 1996,
Camba-Mendez et al., 2003, Mankiw, 1996 and Svensson, 2001). In ecb’s recent evaluation of
its monetary policy framework, it is concluded that ‘...the importance in practice of downward
nominal rigidities is highly uncertain and the empirical evidence is not conclusive, particularly
for the euro area’ (ecb, 2003, page 14).
One possible explanation for the disputable aggregate evidence of dnwr, in spite of strong
microeconomic evidence, may be that the dnwr at the individual level is undone by ﬁrm
behaviour and market mechanisms. Fares and Lemieux (2000) point out that dnwr for ‘stable’
workers may not prevent employers from hiring new workers at lower nominal wages than they
would have done in other circumstances. Indeed, studying the wage adjustments of diﬀerent
groups of Canadian employees, Fares and Lemieux conclude that the bulk of the real-wage
adjustment over the business cycle is experienced by new entrants, for whom dnwr is least
likely to bind. Furthermore, they argue that this may explain why dnwr has little eﬀect
on aggregate wage setting, despite it being important for some groups of workers. Fares and
Lemieux’ results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Card and Hyslop (1997), who on us data
ﬁnd evidence of dnwr for individual workers, but no corresponding evidence on state data.
To explore the eﬀect of dnwr on wages at more aggregate levels, we study industry level
wage data for 19 oecd countries, for the period 1973–99. Based on the idea of previous studies,
we construct the notional wage change distribution (i.e. the assumed distribution under ﬂexible
wages) on the basis of observations from country-years when the wage growth is high and thus
dnwr is not likely to bind. However, our method for comparing the notional and empirical
wage change distributions is simple and novel. Based on the notional wage change distributions,
2we construct country-year speciﬁc notional probabilities of a wage cut. Given these notional
probabilities, we can compute the probability distribution for the number of notional wage
cuts, and compare with the number of empirical wage cuts. Thus, we can calculate the exact
p-value for the number of empirical wage cuts, under the Null hypothesis of no dnwr, as given
by the notional probabilities. In section 4, we document the empirical results and discuss the
robustness of our method. Our robustness tests indicate that the method is able to detect more
than 90 percent of the dnwr that exists in the data.
In addition to investigating the extent of dnwr in aggregate data, we explore in Section 5
potential determinants of dnwr that are suggested in the theoretical literature. As we have
a panel of 19 countries over 27 years, we are able to explore the eﬀect on dnwr of economic
and institutional variables like inﬂation, unemployment, employment protection legislation, and
union density, which are often diﬃcult to evaluate in studies from a single country. We ﬁnd that
dnwr is more prevalent under high union density and strict employment protection legislation.
Such information is useful as it sheds light on both possible explanations for dnwr, and on
how the extent of dnwr might be aﬀected by economic policy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 DNWR and industry wages
Empirical work on dnwr have grown rapidly in recent years, with various types of evidence.
Blinder and Choi (1990), Akerlof et al. (1996), Bewley (1999) and Agell and Lundborg (2003),
among others, report evidence of dnwr based on interviews and surveys of employees and
employers. However, the great majority of studies explores large micro-data sets, based on
personnel ﬁles, survey data or administrative data, and following either of two types of ap-
proaches. The ﬁrst type, initiated by the skewness-location approach of McLaughlin (1994),
focuses on the eﬀect of inﬂation on the distribution of wage changes; Kahn (1997), Christoﬁdes
and Leung (2003), Lebow et al. (2003), Nickell and Quintini (2003) and Elsby (2006) are some
of the recent applications. The second type, referred to as the earnings function approach
by Knoppik and Beissinger (2003), adds other explanatory variables that are usually included
in wage equations, see e.g. Fehr and Gotte (2005) and Altonji and Devereux (2000). More
recently, multi-country studies by Dessy (2002), Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) and Dickens
et al. (2006) have strengthened the evidence of extensive dnwr in most or all oecd countries.
The clear evidence of dnwr for individual workers is not reﬂected in a similar consensus on
the macro economic eﬀects of dnwr. While a few papers ﬁnd evidence of dnwr on aggregate
time-series data, see e.g. Holden (1998), Fortin and Dumont (2000) and Wyplosz (2001), these
eﬀects are disputed. This motivates a closer look at the link from individual dnwr to aggregate
eﬀects. We focus on one part of this link, whether dnwr is apparent in wages at industry level.
3Micro studies typically explore the change in hourly earnings of job stayers, while the
observational unit in our data is the change in the average hourly earnings for all manual
workers in the industry. Numerically, the diﬀerence between these data types can be grouped
in two. First, our data entails averaging over all job stayers, second, our data are aﬀected by
compositional changes, i.e. that the wages of new workers diﬀer from the wages of those who
leave. Concerning the ﬁrst component, averaging over job stayers may mask wage cuts for
single workers if other workers receive wage increases. This will tend to reduce the incidence of
nominal wage cuts (given that the economy-wide wage change is positive), as the average wage
change has a lower variance than individual wage changes.
As for compositional changes, one may expect to ﬁnd both systematic and random eﬀects.
First, there will be a systematic negative eﬀect on wage growth, as older workers who leave
the labour force on average have higher wages than younger, newcomers to the labour market.
Second, one may expect systematic cyclical eﬀects, as the share of low-skilled workers may
decrease in recessions, cf. Solon et al. (1994) and Fares and Lemieux (2000). The lower share
of low-skilled workers in recessions will ceteris paribus lead to higher average wages, thus it
will reduce the number of wage cuts in recessions, when they are most likely. A third point
is that the compositional eﬀects will depend on to what extent job movements in general are
part of a career upwards, involving higher wages, or whether job movements instead might
be undertaken by less productive workers leaving for jobs with lower job requirements. As the
former two eﬀects have opposite impact on the number of wage cuts, and the third is ambiguous,
the overall eﬀect is clearly ambiguous. Turnover also involves a random element which may be
considered as ‘noise’ relative to individual wage rigidity. The noise eﬀect will imply that we
ﬁnd more wage cuts, and thus less rigidity.
Another issue that needs consideration, is to what extent binding dnwr for some workers
may aﬀect the wages of other workers in the industry. One such eﬀect would be if ﬁrms respond
to downward rigidity for some workers by e.g. giving lower wage increases to other workers,
or by changing the composition of the workforce, as suggested by Fares and Lemieux (2000).
Workers who have their wage cut may also quit voluntarily, and new workers could take their
job at the lower pay.
Binding dnwr in one ﬁrm might also aﬀect wages in other ﬁrms. For example, in recessions
with negative productivity or demand shocks, ﬁrms that cannot lower their wages due to dnwr
may respond by laying oﬀ workers, or at least reduce the hiring of new workers. If workers
have industry-speciﬁc skills, the higher number of unemployed workers might contribute to
lower wages in other ﬁrms in the industry, where wages are ﬂexible, thus oﬀsetting the eﬀect of
dnwr in the inﬂexible ﬁrms. However, the extent to which this will happen depends on how











































−.1 0 .1 .2
 
Figure 1: Box plots of annual wage growth in Portugal (left) and histogram of annual wage growth in
1998 (right). The box plot illustrates the distribution of wage changes within a country-year. The box
extends from the 25th to the 75th percentile with the median inside the box. The whiskers emerging from
the box indicate the tails of the distributions and the dots represent outliers.
or employment protection legislation, the workers in these ﬁrms may resist the dampening eﬀect
on wages of higher unemployment. In this case the industry eﬀect of dnwr in some ﬁrms is
not undone.
3 Empirical approach
We use an unbalanced panel of industry level data for the annual percentage growth of gross
hourly earnings for manual workers from the manufacturing, mining and quarrying, electricity,
gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 19 oecd countries in the period 1973–1999.
The countries included in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Por-
tugal, Sweden, the uk and the us. The main data source for wages are harmonised hourly
earnings from Eurostat and wages in manufacturing from ilo.1 One observation is thus de-
noted ¢wjit where j is index for industry, i is index for country and t is index for year. There
are all together 9509 wage change observations distributed across 449 country-year samples,
on average 21 industries per country-year. Figure 1 illustrates the data for Portugal over time
(left) and for Portugal in 1998 (right). We see that the median wage growth and dispersion
fall over time and that there were many small observations of wage increases in 1998. There
are no nominal wage cuts in 331 (74%) of the country-year samples. We observe, however, no
less than Y = 324 events of nominal wage cuts, i.e. an incidence rate of q = 3:4 percent of
all observations. Table A1 in the data appendix for the detailed distribution of wage cuts and
1The data for Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the us are from the ilo, while the data
for Norway is from Statistics Norway. The data from the other countries are from Eurostat.
5observations across countries and years. The data appendix provides more details on the data.
To detect dnwr we use a novel variant of the skewness-location approach of McLaughlin
(1994), where the empirical distribution of wage changes is compared to a postulated notional
distribution, i.e. a counterfactual wage change distribution assumed to prevail in the absence
of dnwr. The key issue in this approach is clearly how to derive the notional distribution.
In the literature, two main approaches have been used, either to assume that the notional
wage change distribution is symmetric (e.g. Lebow et al. (1995), Card and Hyslop (1997) and
Dickens et al. (2006)), or to assume that the shape of the notional wage change distributions is
common across time, (e.g. Kahn, 1997 and Nickell and Quintini, 2003). In the latter case the
shape of the notional distribution is derived from years with high inﬂation, where presumably
dnwr does not aﬀect the wage change observations. Elsby (2006) shows that if wages are rigid
downwards, ﬁrms will respond by compressing wage increases. This would cause the symmetry
method to involve a downward bias in the estimated dnwr. In addition, the wage change
distribution may be asymmetric for other reasons than dnwr, for example if industries are
subject to diﬀerent shocks. Thus, our main method is based on a common shape assumption.
However, for robustness we will also compare with the results using a symmetry assumption.
One popular test of the common shape type, suggested by (Kahn, 1997), explores the eﬀect
of inﬂation on the height of histogram bars of the wage change distribution. However, the
Kahn test relies on the assumption that the notional wage change distribution is invariant
to inﬂation. This property is violated in our case, as both the median wage growth and the
dispersion fall over time in our data, and both have a strong positive correlation with inﬂation
(correlation coeﬃcients are 0.87 and 0.42 respectively). This is illustrated for Portugal in Figure
1. The Nickell and Quintini (2003) method is based on the assumption (or approximation) that
the probability of a nominal wage cut is a function of the median and the dispersion of the
wage changes, with a quadratic term in the former. This approximation is exact if the density
function of wage changes is linear over the appropriate range. As we shall see below (Figure
2), the density function in our data is highly non-linear in the range that is relevant for dnwr.
Thus, this method also involves problematic assumptions in our case.
A further issue is that in most micro studies of dnwr, there has been a focus on the
existence of a spike at zero wage growth, caused by dnwr. Due to compositional eﬀects and
averaging over many workers, there is no spike at zero in our data. Thus, as will be clear below,
we instead focus on the extent of missing wage cuts in the empirical distributions.
We construct the notional wage change distributions on the basis of country-year samples
with high median nominal and real wage growth, to minimize the eﬀect of possible downward
nominal and real wage rigidity. However, to allow for the large variation that exists across
countries and time with respect to monetary policy, wage setting and industry structure, we
6include country-year speciﬁc variation in the location (median) and dispersion of the notional
wage change distributions. Thus, we only impose the same shape in all country-years, but
not the same location and dispersion. This corresponds to assuming the same two-parameter
distribution for all country-years, except that we have not chosen a speciﬁc parametric distri-
bution, but use the shape of the empirical wage change distribution from the high inﬂation
years. Note that an alternative assumption, common in regression based studies, namely that
the notional distribution is normal, would not be suitable due to the higher peak and fatter
tails of the empirical distribution, see Figure 2. By allowing for country-year speciﬁc variation
in the median and the dispersion, in line with Nickell and Quintini (2003), our approach is
less restrictive than other approaches often used in the literature. Furthermore, in section 4.1
below, we report results from a number of alternative assumptions including symmetry, as a
check of the robustness of our results.
3.1 Constructing the notional distribution
More speciﬁcally, the notional distributions are constructed as follows. First, we construct the
underlying distribution based on a subset H of the sample, with SH = 1331 observations from
the 66 country-year samples where both the median nominal and the median real wage growth
are among their respective upper quartiles.2 To avoid as far as possible that the measures
of location and dispersion are aﬀected by dnwr and outliers, we follow Nickell and Quintini
(2003) and measure the location by the median, and the dispersion by the range between the
75th and the 35th percentiles, rather than the mean and the standard deviation (we have also
tried other measures with similar results). The underlying distribution of wage changes is
then constructed by use of the 66 samples with high median nominal and real wage growth,
by subtracting the corresponding country-year speciﬁc median (¹it) and dividing by the inter
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where subscript s runs over all j, i and t in the 66 country-year samples. Figure 2 compares the
underlying distribution of wage changes (illustrated by the histogram and the kernel density in
solid line) with the standard normal distribution (dotted line); we notice that the underlying
distribution is asymmetric as it slightly skewed right.3
Then, for each of the 449 country-years in the overall sample, we construct a notional
2Thus, in these country-year samples, the median nominal wage growth is above the 3rd quartile of 11.8
percent, and the median real wage growth is above 2.8 percent. Four of 1331 observations are below ﬁve percent
nominal wage growth, of which only one is negative.
















Figure 2: Histogram and kernel density (solid line) of the normalised underlying distribution of wage
changes compared to the normal density (dotted line). 14 extreme observations are omitted.
country-year speciﬁc distribution of wage changes by adjusting the underlying wage change







+ ¹it; 8 i;t; and s = 1;:::;SH (2)
Thus, we have then constructed 449 notional country-year samples, each consisting of SH =
1331 wage change observations. These notional country-year samples have by construction the
same median and interpercentile range as their empirical country-year counterparts, whereas
the shape is common for all notional country-year samples, given by the shape of the underlying
distribution.
Given the notional country-year speciﬁc distributions, we can explore the extent of dnwr
by comparing the notional and the empirical distributions. The point estimate of the extent
of dnwr follows directly from comparing the incidence of wage cuts in the empirical and the
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where #¢wjit < 0 is the number of wage cuts and Sit is the number of observations in country-
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For country-years where there is at least one notional wage cut, implying that ~ qit > 0, we can
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Figure 3: Left: Histogram of observed wage changes and the notional wage change distribution (solid
line) in Portugal 1998. Right: Histogram of observed wage changes and the notional wage change
distribution (solid line) in France 1981.
deﬁned as
FWCPit = 1 ¡ qit=~ qit (5)
If, for example, the incidence of wage cuts in the empirical sample is half of that in the notional
distribution, then FWCP = 0.5. Note that if the empirical incidence rate is larger than the
notional, the fwcp is negative. Figure 3 illustrate these measures for Portugal 1998 and France
1981. By construction, the empirical distribution (histogram) and the notional distribution (for
illustrative purposes, we use the kernel density) for the same country-year have the same median
and inter percentile range, but the shapes diﬀer. In Portugal 1998 the incidence rate of notional
wage cuts is 0.22, while the empirical incidence rate is zero, clearly suggesting the existence of
dnwr with a fwcp of unity. The empirical and notional incidence rates are zero for France
1981, so the fwcp is not deﬁned. Obviously there is a lot of variation in the incidence rates
(and thus the fwcp) across the country-year samples, which are reported in Table A2 in the
appendix.4 In order to look for interesting patterns in these estimates across countries, we will
calculate aggregate incidence rates and the fwcp for countries, periods as well as the overall
sample (i.e. all country-years).
We aggregate the country-year estimates by pooling the empirical observations in the rele-
vant sample (eg all country-years) implying that the country-year notional incidence rates are
weighted according to the number of observations within the country-year. For the overall
sample, the fraction of wage cuts prevented is FWCP = 1 ¡ q=~ q = 1 ¡ 0:034=0:046 = 0:259.
Thus, about one out of four notional wage cuts in the overall sample does not result in an ob-
served wage cut due to dnwr. A probably better measure of the economic relevance of dnwr
is the probability than an observation is aﬀected by dnwr. An estimate of this probability
4The empirical and notional incidence rates are zero for 140 country-year samples, while a fwcp of unity is
observed in 196 country-years.
9is the fraction of industry-years aﬀected calculated by the diﬀerence between the notional and
empirical incidence rates, i.e. (~ q ¡ q). For the overall sample this fraction is 0:012 i.e. about
one out of 100 observations (industry-years) were aﬀected by dnwr.
Below we will present estimates of the fraction of wage cuts prevented by dnwr and fraction
of industry-years aﬀected for diﬀerent countries, regions and periods. But before that we provide
a statistical test of the signiﬁcance of our estimates.
3.2 Testing the signiﬁcance of dnwr
To test whether our estimates of the fwcp are statistically signiﬁcant, we exploit that the
incidence rate in the notional wage change distribution can be viewed as the probability of a
wage cut if there was no dnwr. In other words, under the Null hypothesis of no dnwr, the
number of wage cuts in country-year it with, say, 20 industries, is given by 20 independent
draws from the binomial distribution with probability ~ qit. Using the formulae for binomial
distributions, we can then calculate the exact probability for any number of wage cuts for each
country-year under the Null hypothesis of no rigidity, see Table A2. The estimate of fwcp
is signiﬁcantly larger than 0 at the 10% level for ten country-years only, which is not very
surprising given the few number of observations per country-year samples.5
For samples covering more than one country-year, the number of wage cuts under the Null
hypothesis of no dnwr, is given by the combination of several binomial distributions, with
respective incidence rates ~ qit as probabilities. Thus, in principle, we can also compute the exact
probability of signiﬁcance (p-value) for the number of wage cuts in the empirical distribution
for these samples. This calculation is, however, computationally extremely demanding not only
for the overall sample with 9509 observations, drawn from 449 diﬀerent binomial distributions,
but also for separate countries.6 Thus, we compute the p-values on the basis of simulations
instead, which is computationally much simpler, and still highly accurate.
Speciﬁcally, our simulation method goes as follows. For each country-year it, we draw
Sit times (i.e. the number of industries in country-year it) from a binomial distribution with
probability ~ qit. We then add up all the simulated wage cuts for the aggregation level of interest,
e.g. all country years (b Y ), and compare with the total number of wage cuts in the corresponding
empirical distribution, Y = 324. We then repeat this procedure 5000 times, and count the
number of times where we simulate more notional wage cuts than we observe, for the overall
sample denoted #(b Y > Y ). The Null hypothesis is rejected with a level of signiﬁcance at
5These are Belgium 1987 (FWCP = 1, p = 0:039), Canada 1987 (0.75, 0.076), Canada 1996 (0,77 0.045),
Ireland 1992 (1, 0.094), Luxembourg 1993 (1, 0.091), New Zealand 1984 (0.73, 0.099), New Zealand 1991 (0.79,
0.039), Portugal 1995 (1, 0.031), Portugal 1998 (1, 0.008) and uk 1982 (1, 0.084).
6The number of terms in the formulae for the probability of k wage cuts in a sample of S observations is
S!=(k!(S ¡ k)!), which increases rapidly with the number of wage cuts. With S = 9509 and k = 324 in the
overall sample the number of terms is exp(1409:5)
105 percent if 1 ¡ #(b Y > Y )=5000 · 0:05. We can also use the simulation results to obtain
conﬁdence intervals for our estimate of dnwr.
Note that if dnwr is at work in some country-year samples that are used in constructing
the underlying wage change distribution, the underlying and notional wage change distributions
will be compressed. Likewise, if dnwr compresses the inter percentile range in certain country
year samples, the associated notional country year speciﬁc distribution will also be compressed.
Thus, in these cases the notional probabilities will be biased downwards, reducing the number
of simulated wage cuts. This will reduce the power of our test; an issue we shall return to
below. However, under the Null hypothesis of no dnwr, there is no downward bias. Hence
this aspect will not aﬀect the signiﬁcance level of our test.
4 Results
For the whole sample, there are more simulated than observed wage cuts in all 5000 simulations.
Thus we reject the Null hypothesis of no dnwr comfortably with a p-value of 0, as reported
in the bottom line of the ﬁrst column of Table 1. A number of interesting questions arise. Is
there evidence for dnwr for diﬀerent time periods, regions and countries? To what extent is
dnwr related to labour market institutions?
We ﬁrst investigate whether dnwr has changed over time by splitting the sample into
four subperiods 1973–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1994 and 1995–1999. From Table 1 we see that
the number (and incidence) of wage cuts has increased over time as the average wage growth
(and inﬂation) decreased while unemployment increased. dnwr is statistically signiﬁcant in
all periods. In the high-inﬂation 1970s, the fraction of wage cuts prevented was 61 percent. In
the 1980s, it had fallen to 40 percent, and then further to 23 percent in the early 1990s and 16
percent in the late 1990s. However, the number of industry-years aﬀected by dnwr increased
from 0.4 percent in the 1970s to 1.7 percent in the late 1990s.
To investigate whether the change in dnwr over time is signiﬁcant, we undertake Poisson
regressions with the number of observed wage cuts in each country-year sample, Yit, as the
dependent variable, and normalise on the average number of simulated wage cuts for country-
year sample, b Yit. A Poisson regression seems appropriate as the endogenous variable is based on
count data, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998). Adding a time trend, we obtain a trend coeﬃcient
of 0.036, which is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Thus, the ratio of observed to simulated
wage cuts has increased over time, implying that we can conclude that dnwr as measured by
the fraction of wage cuts prevented, has fallen over time.
We then split the sample into four regions; Anglo (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the
uk and the us), Core (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands),
11Table 1: Results from 5000 simulations on subperiods.
Sample properties: All observations 1973–79 1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
No. of observations (S) 9509 2224 3717 1906 1662
No. of country-years 449 109 175 88 77
Average wage growth 13.78% 8.72% 5.60% 3.99%
Average inﬂation rate 10.30% 8.13% 4.42% 2.19%
Average unemployment rate 3.71% 6.72% 8.49% 8.07%
Observed wage cuts (Y ) 324 5 74 93 152
Incidence of wage cuts (q) 0.0341 0.0023 0.0199 0.0488 0.0915
Simulation results:
Fraction of wage cuts prevented (FWCP) 0.259 0.610 0.398 0.231 0.159
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected (^ q ¡ q) 0.012 0.004 0.013 0.015 0.017
Probability of signiﬁcance (p) 0 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.006
Note: p = 1¡#(b Y > Y ) where #(b Y > Y ) is the number of simulations where we simulate more wage cuts (b Y )
than we observe (Y ). q and ^ q are the empirical and average simulated incidence rates respectively.
Table 2: Results from 5000 simulations on regions.
Sample properties: Anglo Core Nordic South
No. of observations (S) 2961 3110 1976 1462
No. of country-years 129 158 95 67
Observed wage cuts (Y ) 153 125 18 28
Incidence of wage cuts (q) 0.0517 0.0402 0.0091 0.0192
Simulation results:
Fraction of wage cuts prevented (FWCP) 0.198 0.234 0.497 0.414
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected (^ q ¡ q) 0.013 0.012 0.009 0.014
Probability of signiﬁcance (p) 0 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
Note: See Table 1
Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and South (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain),
and report the results in columns 2–5 in Table 2. Note that the regions include countries with
rather similar labour market institutions, cf. discussion below.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant dnwr at the one percent level for all regions. The fraction of wage cuts
prevented is high in two regions, 50 percent in the Nordic countries and 41 percent in the South.
In the Anglo and Core groups, the fwcp is considerably lower, around 20 percent. This diﬀer-
ence is roughly in line with what one would expect in view of the diﬀerences in labour market
institutions (in the appendix, we report country-speciﬁc indices for labour market institutions).
Based on a theoretical framework allowing for bargaining over collective agreements as well as
individual bargaining, Holden (2004) argues that workers who have their wage set via unions
or collective agreements have stronger protection against a nominal wage cut, thus the extent
of dnwr is likely to be increasing in the coverage of collective agreements and in union density.
For non-union workers, the strictness of the employment protection legislation (epl) is key to
12Table 3: Results from 5000 simulations on regions and sub-periods.
Region 1973–1979 1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999
No. of observations 698 1149 595 519
No. of country-years 31 50 25 23
Anglo Observed wage cuts 0 26 59 68
Incidence of wage cuts 0 0.0226 0.0992 0.1310
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 1 0.452 0.185 0.018
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.002 0.019 0.023 0.002
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.191 0.000 0.039 0.459
No. of observations 794 1183 587 546
No. of country-years 41 60 30 27
Observed wage cuts 4 40 18 63
Core Incidence of wage cuts 0.0050 0.0338 0.0307 0.1154
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.515 0.304 0.243 0.144
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.019
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.085 0.005 0.113 0.062
No. of observations 474 888 354 260
No. of country-years 23 40 18 14
Observed wage cuts 1 3 12 2
Nordic Incidence of wage cuts 0.0021 0.0034 0.0339 0.0077
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 0.374 0.665 0.292 0.760
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.001 0.007 0.014 0.024
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.520 0.016 0.107 0.009
No. of observations 258 497 370 337
No. of country-years 14 25 15 13
Observed wage cuts 0 5 4 19
South Incidence of wage cuts 0 0.0101 0.0108 0.0564
Fraction of wage cuts prevented 1 0.447 0.485 0.358
Fraction of industry-years aﬀected 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.031
Probability of signiﬁcance 0.252 0.105 0.098 0.019
Note: See Table 1
their possibility of avoiding a nominal wage cut. Thus, one would expect considerable rigidity
in the Nordic countries, where both union density and bargaining coverage are high, while epl
is fairly strict (with the exception of Denmark). One would also expect considerable rigidity in
southern Europe, as epl is very strict and bargaining coverage fairly high, even if union density
is on the low side. In the Core region, even if bargaining coverage is fairly high, and epl fairly
strict, union density is lower than in the Nordic countries, and epl is less strict than in the
South, so one would expect some, but weaker dnwr. Finally, in the Anglo countries, density is
lower and epl weaker than in the other regions, so this is where one would expect the weakest
dnwr. In section 5 below, we analyse the eﬀect of the institutional variables further.
In Table 3, we report results from splitting the sample by combining regions and sub-periods.
13Table 4: Results from 5000 simulations on countries.
Country S T Y q FWCP (^ q ¡ q) p
Austria 408 26 2 0.0049 0.714 0.012 0.025
Belgium 575 26 31 0.0539 0.231 0.016 0.037
Canada 627 26 57 0.0909 0.077 0.008 0.269
Denmark 462 24 8 0.0172 0.463 0.015 0.033
Finland 368 23 2 0.0054 0.663 0.011 0.059
France 556 26 21 0.0378 –0.200 –0.006 0.869
Germany 665 26 16 0.0241 0.060 0.002 0.467
Greece 469 26 7 0.0149 –0.129 –0.002 0.723
Ireland 463 23 27 0.0583 0.325 0.028 0.015
Italy 312 13 0 0 1 0.010 0.037
Luxembourg 423 27 32 0.0757 0.269 0.028 0.023
Netherlands 483 27 23 0.0476 0.387 0.030 0.001
New Zealand 750 27 45 0.0600 0.216 0.017 0.037
Norway 674 27 2 0.0030 0.459 0.003 0.285
Portugal 411 18 3 0.0073 0.860 0.045 0.000
Spain 270 10 18 0.0667 –0.053 –0.003 0.649
Sweden 472 21 6 0.0127 0.469 0.011 0.037
uk 615 26 18 0.0293 0.217 0.008 0.130
us 506 27 6 0.0119 0.308 0.005 0.231
Note: T is the number of years. See also Table 1
This implies a smaller number of observations behind each test statistic, and as expected this
reduces the signiﬁcance levels. It is nevertheless an interesting feature that the fraction of wage
cuts prevented increased in the late 1990s in the Nordic countries, in contrast to the consistent
reduction over time in the other three regions. The fraction of industry-years aﬀected by dnwr
has increased the Nordic region and the South, with a more mixed picture in the Anglo and
the Core.
In Table 4, we report the results concerning individual countries. We observe that for all
countries except Canada, France, Germany, Greece and Spain, the simulations indicate some
dnwr, as some notional wage cuts are prevented (fwcp > 0.2). As these results are also based
on fewer observations, the signiﬁcance levels are lower. dnwr is, however, signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden, and Finland at the ten percent level. It is noteworthy
that the fraction of wage cuts prevented is above 45 percent for all the Nordic countries. A
surprising result is that the South splits in two, with strong dnwr in Portugal and Italy, and
no dnwr in Spain and Greece. The fraction of industry-years aﬀected by dnwr is highest in
Portugal (4.5 percent) and the Netherlands (3 percent).
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Figure 4: Estimated fractions of wage cuts prevented with 90% conﬁdence intervals.
for the fraction of wage cuts prevented based on the distributions from the simulations. Figure
4 presents these intervals for all the categories. The conﬁdence intervals are fairly large, and
with few exceptions, we are not able to conclude that the fwcp are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
one another despite the variation between the estimates.
In view of the large uncertainty one should be careful when interpreting the diﬀerences be-
tween the countries. Nevertheless the estimates may be useful as a benchmark when comparing
with estimates from micro studies. Figure 5 compares our estimates of the fraction of wage cuts
prevented with those reported by Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) and by Dickens et al. (2006).
As discussed in section 2 above, the extent of dnwr may diﬀer between micro and industry
data, and we shall return to this issue in section 5 below. Yet it is of interest to note that
there is some correspondence across countries, with correlation coeﬃcients of 0.65 and 0.25,
respectively. The outliers in both cases are Greece and France. For France, our low estimate
is consistent with Biscourp et al. (2004), who ﬁnd considerable wage ﬂexibility in France. For
Greece, on the other hand, our negative estimate seems questionable. Indeed, our estimate
based on country-speciﬁc underlying distributions reported below, is much closer to the micro
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Figure 5: Comparing our estimates of fwcp with Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) (left) and with Dickens
et al. (2006) (right).
the fraction of wage cuts prevented to about one half is between the two estimates, although
somewhat closer to Dickens et al. (2006). Interestingly, our ﬁnding of strong dnwr for Portugal
is consistent with the institutional feature that a nominal wage cut for a job stayer is illegal in
Portugal.
4.1 Robustness
We explore the robustness of our ﬁndings in a number of diﬀerent directions. To test our
maintained assumption of a common shape for the wage change distributions across countries
and years, we apply a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Concretely, we test for the equality between
the common underlying distribution against alternatives where the underlying distribution is
constructed separately for each country, and where it is constructed separately for each of the
four time periods. The assumption of a common underlying distribution passes easily in all
19 + 27 = 46 tests with the lowest p-value of 0.211.
Nevertheless, we also perform our method with a number of alternative ways of constructing
the underlying distribution. Figure 6 shows that the estimates from the main speciﬁcation
are rather similar to estimates based on country-speciﬁc underlying distributions, and highly
similar to those based on period-speciﬁc underlying distributions. More precisely, we have
constructed separate underlying distributions ¢wu
s based on all observations for each country,
alternatively for each period, and then proceeded with the method as before. Because the
underlying distributions are based on fewer observations, without explicit selection of high
wage growth samples, one would expect this method to be more vulnerable to a downward bias
by dnwr compressing the underlying and notional distributions. Indeed, we ﬁnd somewhat
less dnwr, with overall fwcp of 18 percent (country-speciﬁc) and 20 percent (period-speciﬁc),
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Figure 6: Comparing the estimates of fwcp using a common underlying distribution with country
speciﬁc distributions (left) and periodic speciﬁc distributions (right).
The selection of samples for the underlying distribution, where we used 66 samples with
high median nominal and real wage growth, is clearly somewhat arbitrary. Thus, we have also
performed the method with the underlying distribution based on observations from country-
years with inﬂation above 5 percent in one speciﬁcation and from country-years before 1993 in
another, with results very similar to the period-speciﬁc results.
Finally, we have performed the method with a symmetry assumption inspired by Lebow
et al. (1995) and Card and Hyslop (1997), where observations below the median in all country-
years are replaced by observations from the upper half of the distributions. Thus, all country-
year samples are symmetric, but the distributions diﬀer across country-years according to the
part above the median of the country-year speciﬁc empirical distributions. The results turned
out to be very similar to the results from the main speciﬁcation, cf. Table B1. The estimated
fwcp are however somewhat lower, consistent with a possible downward bias of the symmetry
approach, if dnwr makes ﬁrms compress wage increases, as suggested by Elsby (2006).
Observe that the symmetry approach involves no assumptions across country-year samples.
In contrast, the main approach makes no assumptions regarding symmetry. This implies that
these two approaches are based on orthogonal assumptions. In our view, our ﬁnding of very
similar results from two orthogonal approaches is strong evidence in favour of the robustness
of our results.
As noted above, there is a possible downward bias in our method, if dnwr despite our
precautions have compressed the underlying distribution or inter percentile ranges in some
country-years. One way of exploring the quantitative importance of this bias is to contaminate
the data by adding dnwr, and then see to what extent we are able to detect the dnwr that
we have added. If the downward bias is severe, we would presumably detect much less dnwr
than we have added. Speciﬁcally, we pick ten countries evenly from the four regions (Belgium,
17Table 5: The eﬀect from contaminating the data by adding dnwr.
Countries without additional dnwr Countries with additional dnwr
¢Y ¢fwcr ¢Y ¢fwcr
Austria 0.000 –0.007 Belgium –0.484 –0.421
Italy 0.000 0.000 Canada –0.491 –0.472
Luxembourg 0.000 0.001 Denmark –0.500 –0.495
Netherlands 0.000 0.002 Finland –0.500 –0.501
New Zealand 0.000 –0.003 France –0.476 –0.460
Norway 0.000 –0.022 Germany –0.500 –0.500
Spain 0.000 0.006 Greece –0.429 –0.430
Sweden 0.000 0.000 Ireland –0.481 –0.481
uk 0.000 0.001 Portugal –0.333 –0.329
us –0.500 –0.497
Notes: ¢Y is the contamination of the data in the form of the relative change in the number of nominal wage
cuts. ¢fwcr is the resulting percentage change in the fraction of wage cuts realised. An exact test would yield
a ¢FWCR identical to ¢Y for each country.
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the us), and by
random selection we eliminate half of the nominal wage cuts in each country by setting the
associated nominal wage change to zero, thereby reducing the number of wage cuts from 324 to
238. Due to integer restrictions, we in practice eliminate 48 percent of the nominal wage cuts
(in Portugal we eliminate one out of three observed wage cuts). Again, we apply our procedure
with the contaminated data. With a perfect method, this would reduce the fraction of wage
cuts realised (which is equal to one minus the fraction of wage cuts prevented) by on average
48 percent in these countries, without aﬀecting the fraction of wage cuts realised in the other
countries.
The results are promising. For the aﬀected countries, the average fraction of wage cuts
realised is reduced by 46 percent, as compared to the original results, see Table 5. Taken at
face value, these results suggest that our method on average is able to detect 96 percent of the
total dnwr in the data (calculated as the computed reduction of 46 percent as compared to
the constructed reduction of 48 percent, where 46=48 = 0:96). The variation among the ten
countries is fairly small, varying from a minimum of 42:1=48:4 = 87 percent for Belgium to a
maximum of 100 percent for Finland, Germany, Greece and Ireland. For the other countries, the
fraction of wage cuts realised is hardly aﬀected (on average, it decreases by 0.3 percent, with a
maximum of 2.2 percent for Norway). These results suggest that there is some downward bias in
the estimated dnwr due to dnwr aﬀecting the notional distribution and/or the interpercentile
ranges, but that the eﬀect is not large.
A further point is to what extent our ﬁndings can be caused by downward real wage rigidity
(drwr). Bauer et al. (2003) and Barwell and Schweitzer (2004) ﬁnd evidence for drwr in
Germany and the uk, respectively, while Dickens et al. (2006) ﬁnd drwr for all the 16 oecd
18countries they study. Furthermore, Bauer et al. (2003) point out that by not allowing for
drwr, there is a risk that the extent of dnwr is overestimated. In our data, however, almost
30 percent of all observations are negative real wage changes, by itself a clear sign that if drwr
exists, it is certainly not absolute.
It is hard to distinguish between dnwr and drwr, in particular on industry data, where
random components will imply that we are unlikely to ﬁnd sharp eﬀects exactly at the threshold
points of zero nominal and real growth. In a companion paper, Holden and Wulfsberg (2007),
we address the issue more thoroughly. Here, we limit ourselves to a simple exercise to shed
light on the possible quantitative eﬀects of drwr on our results. Concretely, we add drwr
to our data set by randomly eliminating 20 percent of all observations of real wage cuts (i.e.
618 observations) by setting the associated nominal wage change equal to the rate of inﬂation.
This reduces the total number of nominal wage cuts by 18 percent, from 324 to 265, with
potentially strong impact on any ﬁndings of dnwr. However, applying our method with the
manipulated data, it turns out that our measure of dnwr is not much aﬀected: Eliminating
real wage cuts involves a compression of the notional wage change distributions, implying that
the overall fraction of wage cuts prevented increases by only four percentage points (from 26
to 30 percent). Thus, we conclude that while drwr may have aﬀected our results, it seems
unlikely that the eﬀect is large, in view of the fact that a fairly strong drwr of 20 percent had
a very limited impact on our results.
5 Explaining the number of wage cuts
While the previous analysis documents the existence of dnwr, it does not investigate explicitly
whether the incidence of nominal wage cuts depends on economic and institutional variables.
As mentioned above, Holden (2004) shows that dnwr is likely to depend on inﬂation in a non-
linear way, as well as on institutional variables like the strictness of the employment protection
legislation (epl) and union density or bargaining coverage. Furthermore, high unemployment
may also weaken workers’ resistance to nominal wage cuts. Thus, we apply a Poisson regression
model of the number of wage cuts in each country-year sample, Yit, as the dependent variable
(i.e. 449 observations) and with a number of explanatory variables including inﬂation and
inﬂation squared, an index of epl, union density, the unemployment rate. Regrettably, the
data for institutional variables apply to the whole economy, and not to speciﬁc industry sectors.
As variation in, for example, density or coverage in other parts of the economy would aﬀect the
density and coverage variable, but presumably not aﬀect wage setting in the industry sector,
the estimates of these variables might be biased downwards. On the other hand, if we do ﬁnd
an eﬀect, it seems likely that this is due to the data capturing what we are after.
19We do the analysis in two diﬀerent ways. First, we allow the number of observed wage cuts
within a country-year to depend on the number of observations (industries) in the country-year
sample, Sit, thus estimating the eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the empirical incidence
rate of wage cuts. In the absence of dnwr, the institutional variables should not be able to
explain the variation in the incidence rate. Second, we allow the number of observed wage
cuts within a country-year to depend on the number of notional wage cuts, b Yit, thus estimating
the eﬀect of the explanatory variables on the fraction of notional wage cuts that are actually
realised. Adding institutional variables as regressors, we can then test directly whether these
variables lead to fewer observed than notional wage cuts, i.e. to dnwr.
The conditional density in a Poisson model is









where E(Yit j xit) = ¸it, xit represents the explanatory variables and ¯ is the parameter vector.
However, as the maintained hypothesis in the Poisson model of no overdispersion is rejected,
we use a negative binomial regression model, which allows for overdispersion and can be seen
as a generalisation of the Poisson model.7 Speciﬁcally, we use two alternative speciﬁcations for
the Poisson parameter:
ln¸it = x0
it¯ + "it; "it » ¡(1;±) (7’)
ln¸it = x0
it¯ + "it; "it » ¡(1;Áie¡®i) (7”)
Including a Gamma distributed error term, "it, in (7’) and (7”) allows the variance to mean
ratios of Yit to be larger than unity. (6) and (7’) together yield the pooled negative binomial
regression model. In (7”), we also include a country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, ®i, to allow for a
country speciﬁc variance to mean ratio, see Hausman et al. (1984) for details.
The results of the negative binomial model (where we explain the incidence of wage cuts) are
presented in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 6. In accordance with the theoretical predictions,
epl, union density and inﬂation, all have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the incidence of
nominal wage cuts, although union density is not signiﬁcant in the pooled speciﬁcation. High
unemployment increases the incidence of wage cuts.
The quantitative impact of the institutional variables is fairly large, even if the eﬀects diﬀer
7‘Overdispersion’ means that the variance in the data is greater than the mean, in contrast to the Poisson
assumption that the variance and the mean are equal. Using a goodness-of ﬁt test from a Poisson regression of
Yit=Sit, we reject no overdispersion with Â
2(416) = 634:6.
20Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parenthesis from negative binomial
regressions in columns one and two and from Poisson regressions in columns three and four.
Incidence of wage cuts Fraction of wage cuts realised
Pooled Fixed eﬀects Pooled Fixed eﬀects
Ln(Sit) 1 (–) 1 (–) – –
Ln(Simulated cuts) – – 1 (–) 1 (–)
epl ¡0:291¤ (0:101) ¡0:716¤ (0:196) ¡0:104 (0:059) ¡0:430 (0:293)
Union density ¡0:606 (0:585) ¡1:676 (0:964) ¡0:966¤ (0:377) ¡2:125 (1:423)
Inﬂation ¡0:505¤ (0:073) ¡0:364¤ (0:062) ¡0:096¤ (0:048) ¡0:041 (0:063)
Inﬂation squared 0:017¤ (0:003) 0:012¤ (0:003) 0:004 (0:002) 0:003 (0:003)
Unemployment 0:109¤ (0:029) 0:093¤ (0:036) 0:033¤ (0:016) 0:008 (0:036)
constant ¡1:987¤ (0:454) 1:519¤ (0:762) 0:118 (0:243) —
log-likelihood –360.9 –287.5 –257.5 –209.0
Number of observations 422 409 282 278
Notes: (i) Sit is the number of industries in country-year sample it. (ii)
¤ indicates signiﬁcance at 5%
level. (iii) Luxembourg is not included because of lack of epl data. In addition, Italy is excluded from the ﬁxed
eﬀects models as there are no observed wage cuts in this country. (iv) There are fewer observations in column
3 and 4 because the fraction of wage cuts realised are not deﬁned in 140 country-years where the notional
incidence rate is zero.
according to the method applied. Using the point estimates from the ﬁxed eﬀects model,
a reduction in the epl index by 1.5 units, from the strict level in Portugal to the medium
level of Austria or Sweden, would increase the incidence of nominal wage cuts by a factor of
exp(¡0:716(¡1:5)) = 2:9. This would raise the incidence of wage cuts in Portugal from 0.7
percent to 2.0 percent. A reduction in union density in Denmark from 75 percent down to 25
percent (as in Germany and the Netherlands) is associated with an increase in the incidence rate
from 1.7 to 3.9 percent. A reduction in union density of 20 percentage points, as experienced
in the uk from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, implies an increase in the incidence rate by a
factor of 1.4.
We then investigate whether institutions aﬀect the extent of dnwr as measured by the
average fraction of wage cuts realised (Y=b Y ), by a Poisson regression of Yit normalised on the
number of simulated wage cuts b Yit. The results are presented in columns 3 (pooled) and 4 (ﬁxed
eﬀects) of Table 6. Note that in this case the restriction imposed by the Poisson regression
relative to the negative binomial regression is accepted easily; indeed the results are the same
in the negative binomial model for both speciﬁcations.8 In the pooled regression, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of epl (although only at the ten percent level) and union density
on the fraction of wage cuts realized, implying a positive eﬀect on the fraction of wage cuts
prevented. Unemployment has a negative eﬀect on the fraction of wage cuts prevented.
8The goodness-of-ﬁt test yields Â
2(410) = 280:9.
21Using the estimates from the pooled model, a reduction in the epl index by 1.5 units would
raise the fraction of wage cuts realised by a factor of 1.2 (= exp(¡0:104(¡1:5))). In the case
of Sweden, this would imply an increase in the fraction of wage cuts realised from 52.8 to 61.7
percent, i.e. reducing the fraction of wage cuts prevented from 47.2 to 38.3 percent. Similarly,
a reduction in union density from 75 percent to 25 percent would raise the fraction of wage
cuts realised by a factor of 1.6 (= exp(¡0:966(¡0:5))); for Finland, the fraction of wage cuts
realised would increase from 33.8 to 54.8 percent.
We have also included other institutional variables: bargaining coverage, temporary employ-
ment, and indices of centralisation and coordination, as suggested by Dessy (2002). However,
these variables generally had much lower explanatory power than the variables that are in-
cluded in Table 6. Adding a time trend in the regressions in Table 6 gave positive signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in the models for the incidence of wage cuts, but not in the models for the fraction
of wage cuts realised. The trend coeﬃcient in the ﬁxed eﬀects model is 0.065, implying that
the predicted change in the incidence of wage cuts over a period of 27 years is an increase by
a factor of 5.8 (= exp(0:065(27))). The overall increase was, however, much greater; as shown
in Table 1, the incidence of wage cuts increased from 0.23 percent in the 1970s to 9.15 percent
in the late 1990s. Overall, these results indicate that the reduction in dnwr over time (as
measured by fwcp) is explained by the evolution of the economic and institutional variables,
while there may have been an additional reduction over time in the incidence of wage cuts.
Interestingly, these results are in contrast to recent evidence based on microeconomic data
reported in Dickens et al. (2006), where one ﬁnds weak and insigniﬁcant eﬀect of epl on dnwr,
while union density in fact has a negative eﬀect on dnwr, although only signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level.9 While our analysis does not shed light on why Dickens et al. (2006) do not ﬁnd
any eﬀect of epl and unions on dnwr for individual workers, our discussion in section 2 above
does suggest that epl and unions will have stronger eﬀect on dnwr in industry wages, exactly
like we ﬁnd in the Poisson regressions above. The reason for this is that the industry eﬀect of
dnwr for individual workers might be undone if there is ﬂexible wage setting for other workers
or in other ﬁrms. However, in country-years with strict epl and unions, wage setting is unlikely
to be that ﬂexible. For example, a ﬁrm for which wages are set in a union contract would in
most cases be unable to circumvent wage rigidity by replacing high wage workers with workers
with lower wages.
9Dickens et al. (2006) ﬁnd that union density is positively associated with drwr, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level.
226 Conclusions
Based on a novel method, we document the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity
(dnwr) for manual workers in 19 oecd countries, over the period 1973–1999, using data for
hourly nominal wages at industry level. Overall, we ﬁnd that one out of four of the wage
cuts that should have taken place under complete ﬂexibility (notional wage cuts), have been
prevented by dnwr, while slightly more than one percent of all industry-year observations have
been aﬀected by binding dnwr. To explore the robustness of our results, we have undertaken
a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the key assumptions, with qualitatively the same results.
Our method has also been successful in tests with various forms of ‘contaminated data’.
Our paper makes three main contributions to the literature on dnwr. A number of recent
micro studies, for many diﬀerent countries, have documented that individual wages for job
stayers are rigid downwards. However, the aggregate eﬀects are disputed. One possible reason
for this is that compositional changes at the ﬁrm or industry level may undo wage rigidities
at the individual level. Indeed, this view is consistent with the ﬁndings of Fares and Lemieux
(2000) and Card and Hyslop (1997); the latter ﬁnd evidence of dnwr on us micro data, but
inconclusive evidence for state level data. By documenting the existence of dnwr at industry
level data, we show that ﬁrm behaviour and market mechanisms may diminish, but do not
remove, rigidity at individual level. In this sense we view our study as complementary to the
increasing number of micro studies of dnwr.
Second, we explore whether the extent of dnwr can be explained by economic and insti-
tutional variables. We ﬁnd that stricter employment protection legislation (epl) and higher
union density lead to stronger dnwr: in country-year samples with strict epl and high union
density, the incidence of nominal wage cuts is reduced signiﬁcantly. The estimated eﬀects of
the institutional variables that we ﬁnd is fairly strong. For example, weakening the epl from a
strict to a medium level, would, according to the point estimates, raise the incidence of nominal
wage cuts in Portugal from 0.7 to 2.3 percent. A similar change in the epl in Sweden, from
its current medium level down to the less strict level of the uk, would imply an increase in the
fraction of wage cuts realised from 52.8 to 61.7 percent, i.e. reducing the fraction of wage cuts
prevented from 47.2 to 38.3 percent. Thus, our results suggest that changing labour market
institutions would have considerable impact on wage rigidities.
The eﬀect of institutional variables is consistent with diﬀerences in dnwr across countries.
Splitting into groups of countries, we ﬁnd stronger dnwr in two groups, the South (Italy,
Greece, Portugal, Spain) and the Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden),
where epl is stricter and/or unions are stronger than in the other groups; the Core (Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands), and the Anglo region (Canada, Ireland,
23New Zealand, the uk and the us).
These ﬁndings are also important from a theoretical point of view, as they strengthen
the case for dnwr in part being caused by contracts and institutional features, as argued by
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) in a individual bargaining framework, and Holden (1994)
in a collective agreement framework. Interestingly, the micro study of Dickens et al. (2006)
does not ﬁnd the same positive eﬀect of epl and union density on dnwr that we do. One
possible explanation for this diﬀerence is if dnwr for individual workers can be undone by
wage ﬂexibility for other workers or in other ﬁrms, unless prevented by strict epl and/or union
contracts. For example, for a ﬁrm facing a union contract, it would be diﬃcult to circumvent
wage rigidities by replacing high wage workers by low wage workers. However, as we have not be
able to test for fairness and morale explanations of dnwr, such hypotheses remain speculative.
Furthermore, as argued by Holden (1994), these explanations are likely to be complementary
in the sense that fairness and contract explanations may reenforce each other.
Third, we explore the change in dnwr over time. We ﬁnd that dnwr in the form of
the fraction of notional wage cuts that is prevented by dnwr, has fallen over time. For all
countries together, the fraction of wage cuts prevented by dnwr has fallen from 60 percent
in the 1970s to 16 percent in the late 1990s. The Nordic countries are an exception; for this
group, the fraction of wage cuts prevented is highest in the late 1990s. Most of this reduction
in dnwr can be explained by the change in economic and institutional variables, by less strict
employment protection legislation, lower union density, and higher unemployment. However,
in spite of the reduction in dnwr, the fall in inﬂation has implied that more industries are
aﬀected by dnwr. We ﬁnd that the fraction of industry-years aﬀected by dnwr has increased
from 0.4 percent in the 1970s, to 1.7 percent in the late 1990s.
In an important paper, Barro (1977) argued that short run wage rigidity may reﬂect in-
tertemporal risk sharing between the employer and an risk averse employee, with no allocative
eﬀects, i.e. no eﬀects on employment decisions. On this argument, a ﬁnding of signiﬁcant dnwr
need not imply eﬀects on employment and output. While we cannot rule out this argument,
there are several reasons for why we still believe that dnwr in industry wages is likely to aﬀect
employment and output under low inﬂation. One reason is that in most oecd countries, the
majority of workers have their wages set in collective bargaining, often at more centralised
levels. Presumably, such wage rigidity, being largely exogenous to the ﬁrm, would aﬀect ﬁrms’
employment decisions, in particular as to hirings. This is reﬂected in the dominating explana-
tions of oecd unemployment, where wage setting and labour market institutions play a key role
(Layard et al., 1991 and Nickell et al., 2005). On this basis, one would expect that increased
wage pressure due to binding dnwr would lead to higher unemployment. A second reason is
that several recent contributions have argued that wage rigidity is a necessary and important
24piece in explanations of business cycle ﬂuctuations, see e.g. Erceg et al. (2000), Smets and
Wouters (2003), Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005), the latter two explicitly discussing Barro’s
argument. In an era of low inﬂation, the existence of dnwr would exacerbate wage stickiness
in a downturn of the economy, presumably amplifying the eﬀect on vacancies and employment.
A third reason is that binding dnwr would presumably also push up prices, leading to higher
inﬂation than we would otherwise observe. In most oecd countries, higher inﬂation will be
met by higher real interest rates, which would have a short run dampening eﬀect on output
and employment.
In spite of these arguments, the eﬀect of dnwr on employment and output is clearly an
empirical issue of great interest for future research. In such work, we hope that our country-year
speciﬁc estimates of dnwr may be useful.
Overall, our ﬁnding of dnwr yields clear additional support to the idea that dnwr has
some, but moderate impact on ﬁrms’ wage costs in many oecd countries, especially in Europe.
Weaker employment protection legislation, lower union density, and higher unemployment have
implied that the fraction of wage cuts prevented by dnwr has fallen over time. Yet the fraction
of total industries that have been aﬀected by dnwr has increased over time, due to the lower
rates of inﬂation and lower nominal wage growth in recent years.
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A Data appendix
We have obtained wage data from Eurostat for all countries except Austria, Canada, Finland,
New Zealand Norway, Sweden and the us (see below). The precise source is Table hmwhour
in the Harmonized earnings domain of under the Population and Social Conditions theme in
the newcronos database. Our wage variable (hmwhour) is labelled Gross hourly earnings
of manual workers in industry. Gross earnings cover remuneration in cash paid directly and
regularly by the employer at the time of each wage payment, before tax deductions and social
security contributions payable by wage earners and retained by the employer. Payments for
leave, public holidays, and other paid individual absences, are included in principle, in so far
as the corresponding days or hours are also taken into account to calculate earnings per unit
of time. The weekly hours of work are those in a normal week’s work (i.e. not including public
holidays) during the reference period (October or last quarter). These hours are calculated on
the basis of the number of hours paid, including overtime hours paid. Furthermore, we use
data in national currency and males and females are both included in the data. The data for
Germany does not include gdr before 1990 or new Länder.
The data are recorded by classiﬁcation of economic activities (nace Rev. 1). The sections
represented are Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas and water supply
(E) and Construction (F). We use data on various levels of aggregation from the section levels
(e.g. D Manufacturing) to group levels (e.g. DA 159 Manufacturing of beverages), however,
using the most disaggregate level available in order to maximize the number of observations.
If for example, wage data are available for D, DA 158 and DA 159, we use the latter two only
to avoid counting the same observations twice.
Wage data for Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the us are from Table
5B ‘Wages in manufacturing’ in laborsta, the Labour Statistics Database, ilo. The data are
recorded by isic, Three digit level covering the same sectors as the Eurostat data. Wage data
for Norway are from Table 210 National Accounts 1970–2003, Statistics Norway, recorded by
nace Rev. 1. The sections represented are the same as for the Eurostat data.
28The average number of observations per country-year sample is 20.5, with a standard error
of 4.7. The distribution of the number of wage cuts relative to the number of observations on
years and countries are reported in Table A1.
We have removed ten extreme observations from the sample.
Data for inﬂation and unemployment are from the oecd Economic Outlook database.
The primary sources for the employment protection legislation (epl) index, which is dis-
played in Table A3, are oecd (2004) for the 1980–1999 period and Lazear (1990) for the years
before 1980. We follow the same procedure as Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) to construct time-
varying series which is to use the oecd summary measure in the ‘Late 1980s’ for 1980–89 and
the ‘Late 1990s’ for 1995–99. For 1990-94 we interpolate the series. For 1973–79 the percentage
change in Lazear’s index is used to back-cast the oecd measure. However, we are not able to
reconstruct the Blanchard and Wolfers data exactly.
Data for union density is from oecd. Data for Greece for 1978 and 1979 are interpolated
while data before 1977 is extrapolated at the 1977 level.
Data for bargaining coverage is from oecd (2004, Table 3.5) which provide data for 1980,
1990 and 2000. Data for the intervening years are calculated by interpolation while the obser-
vations for 1980 are extrapolated backwards. Data for Greece and Ireland is only available for
1994 from ilo (1997, Table 1.2). This observation is extrapolated for the entire period.
The incidence of temporary employment is deﬁned as the fraction of temporary to total
employment. Data from 1983 is from oecd’s Corporate Data Environment, Table Employment
by permanency of the (main) job. Data for Finland 1995 and 1996 and Norway are from
Eurostat. Data for Sweden are provided by the Statistics Sweden (SCB). Lacking information





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table A3: Indices for employment protection legislation, epl
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 1.32 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 4.00 2.30 2.44 3.60 0.76 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.17 2.57 0.56 0.20
1974 1.39 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 4.00 2.30 2.57 3.60 0.83 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.43 3.03 0.58 0.20
1975 1.47 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 4.00 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.68 3.50 0.60 0.20
1976 1.61 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.96 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.76 3.50 0.60 0.20
1977 1.76 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.92 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.85 3.50 0.60 0.20
1978 1.91 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.88 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 3.93 3.50 0.60 0.20
1979 2.05 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.84 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.02 3.50 0.60 0.20
1980 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1981 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1982 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1983 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1984 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1985 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1986 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1987 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1988 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1989 2.20 3.20 0.80 3.20 2.30 3.80 2.30 2.70 3.60 0.90 3.60 2.70 2.90 0.90 4.10 3.50 0.60 0.20
1990 2.20 3.03 0.80 3.08 2.15 3.65 2.27 2.75 3.58 0.90 3.45 2.60 2.87 0.90 4.03 3.28 0.60 0.20
1991 2.20 2.87 0.80 2.97 2.00 3.50 2.23 2.80 3.57 0.90 3.30 2.50 2.83 0.90 3.97 3.07 0.60 0.20
1992 2.20 2.70 0.80 2.85 1.85 3.35 2.20 2.85 3.55 0.90 3.15 2.40 2.80 0.90 3.90 2.85 0.60 0.20
1993 2.20 2.53 0.80 2.73 1.70 3.20 2.17 2.90 3.53 0.90 3.00 2.30 2.77 0.90 3.83 2.63 0.60 0.20
1994 2.20 2.37 0.80 2.62 1.55 3.05 2.13 2.95 3.52 0.90 2.85 2.20 2.73 0.90 3.77 2.42 0.60 0.20
1995 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1996 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1997 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1998 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
1999 2.20 2.20 0.80 2.50 1.40 2.90 2.10 3.00 3.50 0.90 2.70 2.10 2.70 0.90 3.70 2.20 0.60 0.20
Table A4: Trade union density, percent
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 60.8 47.6 34.60 32.4 62.2 61.4 22.1 35.8 53.3 43.3 45.0 36.2 53.2 58.18 72.5 45.5 23.50
1974 57.9 49.0 35.00 33.7 65.2 63.2 21.7 35.8 53.9 46.2 45.6 36.0 54.1 59.12 73.5 46.4 23.20
1975 59.0 51.8 36.30 34.6 68.9 65.3 22.2 35.8 55.3 48.0 45.7 37.8 53.8 60.06 74.5 48.3 21.60
1976 59.2 52.6 35.70 35.1 73.0 67.6 21.4 35.8 56.3 50.5 46.7 37.1 52.8 61.00 73.9 49.4 21.60
1977 58.6 53.5 36.50 35.2 74.1 66.4 21.4 35.8 57.0 49.8 47.7 37.2 53.6 63.67 76.0 51.1 23.20
1978 57.6 53.1 36.00 35.5 77.8 66.9 20.7 36.9 57.6 50.4 48.9 37.0 54.0 66.33 60.8 77.0 51.8 22.40
1979 56.7 53.8 35.10 35.3 77.1 68.1 19.2 37.9 57.5 49.7 49.4 36.6 55.5 69.00 60.2 77.3 51.6 23.40
1980 56.7 54.1 34.90 34.9 78.6 69.4 18.3 39.0 57.1 49.6 50.8 35.3 58.3 69.10 59.7 78.0 50.7 22.30
1981 56.4 53.4 35.30 35.1 79.9 7.4 68.3 17.8 38.8 56.6 48.0 52.2 33.5 57.9 65.70 61.8 78.3 50.5 21.00
1982 53.8 52.1 35.80 35.0 80.2 8.4 68.4 17.0 38.4 56.1 46.7 52.5 32.8 58.1 65.10 61.1 78.9 48.7 20.25
1983 53.6 51.9 36.60 35.0 80.8 8.9 68.8 16.0 38.6 57.2 45.5 53.0 31.3 58.1 64.50 57.8 79.6 48.0 19.50
1984 52.1 52.0 34.70 34.9 79.3 8.6 69.0 14.9 38.0 57.0 45.3 53.0 30.0 58.3 59.50 56.3 80.8 47.5 18.20
1985 51.6 52.4 32.60 34.7 78.2 8.9 69.1 13.6 37.5 54.2 42.5 52.3 28.7 57.5 56.00 54.6 81.3 46.2 17.40
1986 50.6 51.5 33.00 33.9 77.4 8.6 70.0 12.5 37.2 51.6 40.4 51.1 27.3 57.1 54.10 51.4 82.5 44.8 17.00
1987 49.6 51.6 32.90 33.3 75.0 9.1 70.7 11.9 36.3 50.2 40.0 49.8 24.9 55.7 52.80 47.7 82.4 44.5 16.50
1988 48.9 51.4 34.30 33.1 73.8 9.6 72.3 11.2 34.9 50.5 39.8 48.1 24.7 56.1 54.20 42.3 81.4 42.6 16.20
1989 48.0 52.4 33.00 32.4 75.6 10.0 73.0 10.7 33.7 51.8 39.4 46.1 25.1 58.0 55.10 37.6 80.7 40.6 15.90
1990 46.9 53.9 32.90 31.2 75.3 11.0 72.3 10.1 32.4 51.1 38.8 44.7 25.5 58.5 51.00 31.7 80.0 39.3 15.50
1991 45.5 54.3 35.30 36.0 75.8 14.7 74.4 10.0 32.4 51.2 38.7 42.6 25.6 58.1 44.40 31.5 80.1 38.5 15.50
1992 44.3 54.3 33.10 33.9 75.8 16.5 76.8 10.2 32.0 51.3 38.9 41.5 25.2 58.1 37.10 29.0 82.9 37.2 15.10
1993 43.2 55.0 32.80 31.8 77.3 18.0 78.8 10.1 31.1 50.0 39.2 40.7 25.9 58.0 34.50 28.6 83.9 36.1 15.10
1994 41.4 54.7 34.20 30.4 77.5 17.6 78.0 10.0 30.3 48.6 38.7 39.6 25.6 57.8 30.20 27.3 83.7 34.2 14.90
1995 41.1 55.7 33.80 29.2 77.0 16.3 79.2 9.8 29.6 47.1 38.1 38.6 25.7 57.3 27.60 25.4 83.1 34.1 14.30
1996 40.1 55.9 34.00 27.8 77.4 16.1 78.8 9.8 28.9 45.4 37.4 38.4 25.1 56.3 24.90 24.8 82.7 33.2 14.00
1997 38.9 56.0 28.80 27.0 75.6 15.7 79.4 9.8 28.6 44.4 36.2 38.0 25.1 55.5 23.60 24.3 82.2 32.1 13.60
1998 38.4 55.4 28.50 25.9 76.8 14.9 77.7 9.8 26.7 42.4 35.7 37.4 24.5 55.5 22.30 23.3 81.3 31.5 13.40
1999 37.4 55.1 27.90 25.6 76.3 14.5 77.4 9.8 26.1 40.6 36.1 35.7 24.6 54.8 21.90 23.5 80.6 31.4 13.40
34Table A5: Indices for bargaining coverage
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1974 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1975 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1976 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1977 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1978 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1979 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1980 95.0 90.0 37.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 70.0 26.0
1981 95.0 90.0 37.1 80.0 70.0 61.0 90.0 81.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 67.0 25.2
1982 95.0 90.0 37.2 80.0 70.0 62.0 90.0 82.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 64.0 24.4
1983 95.0 90.0 37.3 80.0 70.0 63.0 90.0 83.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 61.0 23.6
1984 95.0 90.0 37.4 80.0 70.0 64.0 90.0 84.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 58.0 22.8
1985 95.0 90.0 37.5 80.0 70.0 65.0 90.0 85.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 55.0 22.0
1986 95.0 90.0 37.6 80.0 70.0 66.0 90.0 86.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 52.0 21.2
1987 95.0 90.0 37.7 80.0 70.0 67.0 90.0 87.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 49.0 20.4
1988 95.0 90.0 37.8 80.0 70.0 68.0 90.0 88.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 46.0 19.6
1989 95.0 90.0 37.9 80.0 70.0 69.0 90.0 89.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 43.0 18.8
1990 95.0 90.0 38.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 40.0 18.0
1991 95.0 90.0 37.4 78.8 71.0 71.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 71.0 70.0 56.5 71.0 81.0 39.0 17.6
1992 95.0 90.0 36.8 77.6 72.0 72.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 72.0 70.0 53.0 72.0 82.0 38.0 17.2
1993 95.0 90.0 36.2 76.4 73.0 73.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 73.0 70.0 49.5 73.0 83.0 37.0 16.8
1994 95.0 90.0 35.6 75.2 74.0 74.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 74.0 70.0 46.0 74.0 84.0 36.0 16.4
1995 95.0 90.0 35.0 74.0 75.0 75.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 75.0 70.0 42.5 75.0 85.0 35.0 16.0
1996 95.0 90.0 34.4 72.8 76.0 76.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 76.0 70.0 39.0 76.0 86.0 34.0 15.6
1997 95.0 90.0 33.8 71.6 77.0 77.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 77.0 70.0 35.5 77.0 87.0 33.0 15.2
1998 95.0 90.0 33.2 70.4 78.0 78.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 78.0 70.0 32.0 78.0 88.0 32.0 14.8
1999 95.0 90.0 32.6 69.2 79.0 79.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 80.0 79.0 70.0 28.5 79.0 89.0 31.0 14.4
Table A6: Indices of centralisation
Year AT BE CA DE DK ES FI FR IE IT NL NO NZ PT SW UK US
1973 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1974 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1975 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1976 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1977 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1978 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1979 3.0 3.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 2.0 1.0
1980 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1981 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1982 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1983 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1984 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 1.0
1985 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1986 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1987 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1988 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1989 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 3.0 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1990 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1991 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1992 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1993 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1994 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1995 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1996 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1997 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1998 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
1999 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
35B Results with country speciﬁc and period speciﬁc underlying
distributions and country-year speciﬁc symmetric distribu-
tion
Table B1: Results with country speciﬁc and period speciﬁc underlying distributions and country-year
speciﬁc symmetric distribution. The period speciﬁc underlying distributions are based on observations
from the periods 1973–79, 1980–89, 1990–94 and 1995–1999 respectively.
Country speciﬁc shape Period speciﬁc shape Symmetric
Category Y FWCP ^ q ¡ q p FWCP ^ q ¡ q p FWCP ^ q ¡ q p
All 324 0.181 0.008 0.000 0.196 0.008 0.000 0.200 0.009 0.000
1970–79 5 0.602 0.003 0.013 0.603 0.003 0.015 0.501 0.002 0.061
1980–89 74 0.304 0.009 0.000 0.292 0.008 0.000 0.230 0.006 0.009
1990–94 93 0.157 0.009 0.029 0.190 0.011 0.009 0.213 0.013 0.005
1995–99 152 0.087 0.009 0.098 0.112 0.011 0.044 0.159 0.017 0.005
Anglo 153 0.110 0.006 0.054 0.132 0.008 0.026 0.124 0.007 0.029
Core 125 0.158 0.008 0.013 0.172 0.008 0.006 0.220 0.011 0.000
Nordic 18 0.330 0.004 0.033 0.458 0.008 0.001 0.359 0.005 0.018
South 28 0.424 0.014 0.001 0.344 0.010 0.007 0.333 0.010 0.007
Austria 2 0.380 0.003 0.373 0.681 0.010 0.045 0.019 0.000 0.661
Belgium 31 0.102 0.006 0.252 0.189 0.013 0.079 0.205 0.014 0.038
Canada 57 0.014 0.001 0.481 0.013 0.001 0.492 0.047 0.004 0.366
Denmark 8 0.197 0.004 0.335 0.373 0.010 0.106 0.336 0.009 0.138
Finland 2 –0.070 –0.000 0.715 0.631 0.009 0.090 0.601 0.008 0.108
France 21 –0.067 –0.002 0.680 –0.242 –0.007 0.905 –0.050 –0.002 0.663
Germany 16 0.108 0.003 0.365 –0.028 –0.001 0.613 0.060 0.002 0.460
Greece 7 0.271 0.006 0.250 –0.137 –0.002 0.722 –0.000 –0.000 0.605
Ireland 27 0.193 0.014 0.134 0.252 0.020 0.059 0.035 0.002 0.471
Italy 0 1.000 0.009 0.050 1.000 0.009 0.047 — 0.000 1.000
Luxembourg 32 0.138 0.012 0.191 0.185 0.017 0.102 0.275 0.029 0.018
Netherlands 23 0.357 0.026 0.004 0.337 0.024 0.007 0.395 0.031 0.001
New Zealand 45 0.125 0.009 0.176 0.145 0.010 0.141 0.238 0.019 0.022
Norway 2 0.593 0.004 0.131 0.489 0.003 0.252 — 0.000 1.000
Portugal 3 0.804 0.030 0.000 0.840 0.038 0.000 0.823 0.034 0.000
Spain 18 0.129 0.010 0.319 –0.212 –0.012 0.839 0.001 0.000 0.567
Sweden 6 0.401 0.009 0.087 0.461 0.011 0.043 0.454 0.011 0.051
uk 18 0.204 0.007 0.151 0.180 0.006 0.193 0.217 0.008 0.129
us 6 0.119 0.002 0.472 0.227 0.003 0.339 –0.206 –0.002 0.770
Notes: Under the symmetry approach, we do not simulate any notional wage cuts for Italy and Norway, hence
the fwcp is not deﬁned for these countries. See also notes to Table 1
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